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INTRODUCTION TO SYMPOSIUM
STEFAN A. RIESENFELD*
Bankruptcy is an accepted and important" branch of the law,
though one that is notorious for its intricacy and complexity. To be
sure, its over-all goals are easy to state: relief of the honest but un-
fortunate debtor from the oppressive burden of his debts; liquidation
of the insolvent estate for the benefit of the creditors. Yet, when one
descends to the levels of fashioning and correlating the guiding
policies and of elaborating the details of their implementation and
administration one encounters mounting obstacles and troubles.
These difficulties flow from two major sources of conflicts. One of
them is produced by the inherent clash of interests which is bound
to occur whenever available funds and claims don't match, whenever
a shadowy past must be separated from a brighter future. Thus
secured and unsecured creditors, the bankrupt and pre-bankruptcy
transferees line up in opposing camps and necessitate some adjust-
ment and accommodation of their conflicting interests. The other
generator of difficulties lies in the federal structure with its plurality
of legal orders and courts which likewise require a fair and prudent
reconciliation of divergent policies and competencies. Although
bankruptcy, in the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, is basically
a "federal specialty"12 it does not and cannot operate in a water-
*Professor of Law, University of California.
1. According to the Tables of Bankruptcy Statistics, Ending Jtune 30,
1954 (published by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts)
there were 53,136 new bankruptcy cases filed during the fiscal year 1954.42,723
thereof involved straight bankruptcy proceedings, 41,335 arising upon volun-
tary petitions. Of the 43,494 cases terminated during the fiscal year 1954, 5,062
were asset cases, 3,925 were nominal asset cases and 23,894 were no asset cases,
the remainder arising under the special relief sections and chapters of the act
The 5,062 asset cases closed netted proceeds of $34,623,745. The breakdown of
this sum shows the following distribution:
Recipients Amounts in $
Secured Creditors .... 9,519,970 (equalling 58.7% of the claims allowed)
Priority Creditors .... 5,680,352 (equalling 32.1% of the claims allowed)
Unsecured Creditors 8,808,752 (equalling 9.6% of the claims allowed)
Exemptions .......... 128,753
Administrative
Expenses ........... 8,856,729 (including 3,705,315 for attorneys' fees)
Other Payments ...... 1,629,189
2. Frankfurter, Distribution of AJdicial Power Between United States
and State Courts, 13 Corn. L. Q. 499, 507 n. 37.
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tight compartment. Rules and concepts of state law frequently-and
often subtly and elusively3-- determine or trench on important bank-
ruptcy consequences, while, conversely, state courts have to adjudi-
cate and determine innumerable bankruptcy questions of varying
complexion and complexity. Thus bankruptcy law almost reduces
itself to an infinite series of compromises and assumes the appear-
ance of a veritable maze or labyrinth, forbidding to the outsider and
mysterious even to the expert.
Though American bankruptcy law is the product of a long
history and experience, molded by economic forces, needs and poli-
cies, which have imparted amazingly similar features to the bank-
ruptcy laws of all modern commercial nations, 4 the field still bristles
with thorny issues which demand the smoothing application of sys-
tematic treatment if not the more drastic remedy of legislative sur-
gery. Whenever the law is ca!led to allocate relative priority and
status to conflicting interests, the standards of determination more
often than not come to rest on arbitrary lines or delusive formulae
which from time to time require rechecking or overhauling. Neither
"prior in time, prior in right" nor "equality is equity" are panaceas.r
In fact they act as bromides on more acute analysis. Legislative
language is likewise not always the key to the appropriate standard.
Draftsmen are not clairvoyant or omniscient and their language and
techniques are apt to come to hound them, especially in a field where
the equities are not patent and where inconsistencies and defects in
statutory formulation cause particular headaches to the profession.
A new look at bankruptcy, such as solicited and stimulated by the
editors of the Minnesota Law Review, is therefore bound to clarify
old problems and to point to needed improvements.
Professor MacLachlan's contribution on the Protection and
Collection of Property by the Trustee in Bankruptcy not only gives
an excellent picture of the practical steps and problems involved,
but it serves as a poignant illustration, how the cumulation of a "mis-
leading insinuation," contained in one section of the statute, and of
an "inartistic reference," inserted into another, has succeeded in
causing uncertainty and confusion about the essence and scope of the
function of bankruptcy courts. As Professor MacLachlan shows,
3. See, for an illustration, Mussman and Riesenfeld, Garnishment and
Bankruptcy, 27 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1942), focussing on the notion of lien.
4. For details see Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy
Law, 31 Minn. L. Rev. 401 (1947).
5. For an excellent analysis of the maxim "prior in time, prior in law" as
a mere rule of convenience, see Costigan, The Theory of Chancery in Protect-
ing against the Cestui Que Trust One Who Purchases from a Trustee for
Value and Without Notice, 12 Calif. L. Rev. 356, 364 (1924).
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this perplexity crops up under a variety of aspects, which could
easily be multiplied. Thus, though subsequent amendments to Rule
73(a) of the federal rules have greatly reduced the practical im-
portance of the question, it is still worth pondering whether or not
the reorientation accomplished in Williams v. Austrian" has pulled
the basis from under Lowenstein v. Reikes7 and the cases following
it, despite their valiant endorsement by the editors of Collier.,
Professor Kennedy's thoughtful essay sheds much, though not
exactly rosy, light on the controversial and precarious status of the
statutory lien. This problem, long a major headache to policy makers
and practitioners alike, has prompted a series of legislative interven-
tions. Yet, as the author points out, "every piece of legislation enact-
ed to take care of old difficulties create[d] new difficulties of its
own." The author ventures a new proposal. The old Greek fable of
Hydra comes readily to one's mind. Will Professor Kennedy be the
Hercules who finally slays the monster?
Referee Friebolin and Professor Smedley devote their attention
to important policy questions regarding the forfeiture of the right
to a discharge and the proper forum for determining the discharge-
ability of debts. Since the great bulk of bankruptcy proceedings is
of the voluntary and the non-asset type, the social importance of
such problems is self-evident. The same consideration is deserved
by Referee Kruse's article on the reestablishment of special farmer-
debtor relief. Nobody can deny that this is a timely and significant
problem.
It goes without saying that any symposium on bankruptcy within
the covers of a single law review issue can only be selective and of
necessity depends on the special predilections and preoccupations of
the individual contributors. No one could expect that all of the most
pressing or most difficult or even most recent bankruptcy problems
are dealt with. The profession is constantly faced with new and often
unexpected puzzles.9 Certainly the contributions from five experts,
different as they are in content, scope and depth, should be food for
thought or help in our daily troubles.
6. 331 U. S. 642 (1947). For an analysis of the reasoning and some of
the implications of this decision, see also Mussman and Riesenfeld, Jurisdiction
in Bankruptcy, 13 Law & Contemp. Prob. 88, especially at 99 (1948).
7. 54 F. 2d 481 (2d Cir. 1931).
8. Collier, Bankruptcy § 24.10 (14th ed. 1940). The author of the 1954
Supplement has not felt a need for commenting on that issue.
9. For a recent illustration see Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 218 F.
2d 394 (4th Cir. 1954), holding that the life insurance proviso in § 70(a) (5)
does not postpone the date when title to the cash surrender value vests in the
trustee until the expiration of the thirty day period, thus leaving the protec-
tion of the insurance company against double liability to the general rules
specified in § 70(d) (2) and (4).
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